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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

The instant case,3 5 in promulgating the principle that damages
may be recovered for fright and its effects if there is a physical
impact concurrent with the fright, has taken a progressive and a
logical step in the direction of modifying the doctrine of the Mitchell
case. The effect of the decision in actions which may arise in the
future will always be limited by a determination of whether the
injuries are the immediate and evident result of the defendant's lack
of care. It would be even a more reasonable and a more just rule if,
regardless of physical injuries or physical impact, fright and shock
in the chain of causation between the wrongful
were treated as links
36
act and the injury.
PHILIP V. MANNING,

JR.

LIABILITY OF LANDLORD IN TORT FOR INJURIES SUFFERED ON
LEASED PREMISES-PROPOSED STATUTORY CHANGE.

It has been remarked that under present rules of law a tenant
has two rights: first, to sign the lease, and second, to pay the rent.
This banter is more caustic than witty, and in a sense portrays the
notorious situation of unbalance existing in the law of Landlord and
Tenant. The heritage of ancient conditions is a law of real property
which, in modern urban life, creates situations which are patently
unfair to the lessee. Slowly and gradually are the more glaring
inequities being eradicated.' It is only a matter of seventy years
2

Supra note 8.

Supra note 5, Throckmorton, 34 HARv. L. REv., p. 268, "The first

reason" (namely, p. 265, that fright caused by negligence is not itself a cause
of action none of its consequences can give a cause of action) "assigned for
denying recovery for nervous shock resulting from fright may therefore be
dismissed with the statement that while it is true no recovery may be had for
mere fright for want of a physical injury yet physical injury resulting from a
wrongful act is actionable, whether the injury be to the nerves or to some other
part of the body and regardless of whether the link in the chain of causation
between the wrongful act and the injury to the nerves is physical impact or
fright. The essential thing is the existence of the link in the chain of causation,
not the character of that link."
'In Franklin v. Brown, 118 N. Y. 110, 113, 23 N. E. 126 (1889), Vann, J.,
speaking for the court said: "It is not open to discussion in this state that a
lease, of real property only, contains no implied covenant of this character and
that in the absence of an express covenant, unless there has been fraud, deceit
or wrong-doing on the part of the landlord, the tenant is without remedy even
if the demised premises are unfit for occupation." (Citing Witty v. Matthews,
52 N. X. 512, and Jaffe v. Harteau, 56 N. Y. 398.) Twenty-four years later,
in Streep v. Simpson, 80 Misc. 666, 141 N. Y. Supp. 863 (1913), the court,
aware of the pronounced change in living conditions, relaxed the rigor of the
above rule and said: "Co.itionsunknown to the ancient common law are thus
created. This requires elasticity in, the application of the principles thereof.
An intolerable condition which the defendant neither causes nor can remedy,
seems to me, warrants the application of the doctrine of constructive eviction."
(Italics ours.)

NOTES AND COMMENT
since a tenant is excused from paying rent for a house which has been
destroyed by fire. 2 Although both landlord and tenant were equally
blameless and equally impotent to prevent or check the disaster, the
law exacted toll from the tenant and made him pay for the use of
that which was non-existent. 3 This article is concerned with calling
attention to a similar piece of apparent injustice ingrained in the
common law; to a doctrine which wreaks a hardship on the tenant,
and immunizes the landlord from a liability which should attach to
the results of his own misdoing.
Under the existing common-law rule, the landlord has no duty
to keep leased premises in repair.4 Such an obligation can arise only
by contract between the parties. 5 The absence of duty precludes
responsibility in tort: 6 breach of covenant to repair involves purely
a breach of contract. 7 Damages, then, are those which can be said to
have been within the contemplation of the parties when making the
contract,8 and decisions have been legion to the effect that a covenant
to repair will not be interpreted to mean that the landlord has
assumed to indemnify the lessee for consequential losses arising out
of his failure to fulfill his promise. 9
In a recent decision of the Court of Appeals, Cullings v. Goetz,9a
this holding is reiterated. In that case the plaintiff, having been
injured by a falling garage door, joined the lessee of the garage
and the lessor of the premises, in a negligence action. The lessor
had covenanted to keep the premises in repair, and had been notified
of the existent defective condition. It was held that since the lessor
had renounced control to another, the tenant in possession had assumed such responsibility as exclusive occupation entails. From him
alone might an injured party seek redress. The lessor had made a
purely private contractual arrangement with his lessee to repair:
that was the measure of his duty; the cost of making the repairs,
2

Laws of 1860, c. 345; now N. Y. REAL PRop. L. §227; Syndham' v.
Jackson, 54 N. Y. 450 (1873).
'Graves v. Berdan, 26 N. Y. 498, 501, 502 (1863).
'Golob v. Pasinsky, 178 N. Y. 458, 70 N. E. 973 (1904).
'Ahern v. Steele, 115 N. Y. 203, 22 N. E. 193 (1889).
o Of course, there is a duty to disclose known hidden defects. Caesar v.
Karutz, 60 N. Y. 229 (1875); Daly v. Wise, 132 N. Y. 306, 30 N. E. 837
(1892).
7 Schick v. Fleischauer, 26 App. Div. 210, 49 N. Y. Supp. 962 (1st Dept.
1898).
8
Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 23 L. J. Ex. 179, 18 Jur. 358, 26 Eng.
L. & Eq. 398 (1854).
9Murrell v. Crawford, 102 Kan. 118, 169 Pac. 561 (1918); O'Neil v.
Brown, 158 Ky. 118, 164 S. W. 315 (1914); Korach v. Loeffel, 168 Mo. App.
261, 173 S. W. 707 (1913); Spellman v. Bannigan, 36 N. Y. 174 (1885);
Sanders v. Smith, 5 Misc. 1, 25 N. Y. Supp. 125 (1893) ; Schiff v. Pottlitzer,
51 Misc. 611, 101 N. Y. Supp. 249 (1906).
0a256 N. Y. 287, 176 N. E. 397 (1931).
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the measure of his obligation.' 0 If the tenant himself could not
maintain a suit ex delicto for injuries sustained, it is clear that no
greater right would inure to members of his family 1 or to his
2
invitee.1
There is no doubt that this case is well decided according to a
host of past adjudications. 13 And yet, although this ruling is supported by most text-writers 14 and by good legal reasoning, the court
seems to sense an injustice. Wedged in between the terse, objective,
rigid statements of the law, one detects a flicker of sympathy for the
tenant and the injured suitor. Says Cardozo, J., "Countless tenants,
suing for personal injuries and proving nothing more than the breach
of an agreement, have been dismissed without a remedy. * * * Countless visitors of tenants and members of a tenant's family have encountered a like fate." There is an apprehension of victimization. Despite
the facile flow and apparent logic of his legal dialectic, the impression '1 lingers that the eminent chief judge is subjectively apologizing
in the words of Alderson, J., the English jurist, who once wrote, "My
duty is plain. It is to expound the law, and not to make the law; to
decide on it as I find it, not as I may wish it to be." 16
Where there have been a series of decisions by the supreme
court of a state, the rule of stare decisis may usually be regarded as
impregnable, the holding to be altered only by legislative act.17 Such
a statute was passed by our legislature to change the common law
liability of a landlord to an apartment house tenant. 1 8 Liability in
tort was imposed, 19 with the salutary result that landlords, fearful of
being held financially accountable for resultant injuries, have become
actually anxious to do that which they contracted to do. It is urged
"Schiff v. Pottlitzer, 51 Misc. 611, 101 N. Y. Supp. 249 (1906).

Nor can

a tenant get compensation from the landlord for damages paid to a third party.

Kushes v. Ginsberg, 188 N. Y. 630, 81 N. E. 1168 (1907).

SFrank v. Mandel, 76 App. Div. 413, 78 N. Y. Supp. 855 (2d Dept. 1902).

'Elefante v. Pizitz, 182 App. Div. 819, 169 N. Y. Supp. 910 (1st Dept.
1918).
' Walker v. Swayzee, 3 Abb. Pr. 136 (N. Y. 1856); Flynn v. Hatton,

43 How. Pr. 333 (N. Y. 1872) ; Sterger v. Van Sicklen, 132 N. Y. 499, 30 N. E.
987 (1892); Reynolds v. Van Beuren, 155 N. Y. 120, 49 N. E. 763 (1898);

Golob v. Pasinsky, 178 N. Y. 458, 70 N. E. 973 (1904); Kushes v. Ginsberg,
188 N. Y. 630, aff'g, 99 App. Div. 417, 81 N. E. 1168 (1907).
" POLLOCK, TORTS (13th ed. 1929) p. 532; SALMOND, TORTS (7th ed. 1928)
p. 477; WALSH, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1927) §177, pp. 296, 297, 298.
' Cardozo, J., for the court: "The doctrine, wise or mwise in its origin,

has worked itself by common acquiescence into the tissue of our law. It is too
deeply imbedded to be superseded or ignored." (Italics ours.)
See Miller v. Salomons, 7 Ex. 475, 541 (1852).
17Harrow v. Meyers, 29 Ind. 470 (1868).
IS TENEMENT HOUSE LAW,

c. 61 of Con. Laws, §2, subd. 1; §102.

In Altz v. Lieberson, 233 N. Y. 16, 134 N. E. 703 (1922), another reason
is adduced in support of the statutory change. Said the court: "The legislature
2

must have known that unless repairs in the rooms of the poor were made by
the landlord, they would not be made by anyone."

This argument applies with

like force to the case of an indigent lessee of store property.

NOTES AND COMMENT
that this statutory liability be extended to include all property, business as well as residential, leased under a covenant to repair.
The rule contended for obtains in many jurisdictions, 20 wherein
the courts hold that the lessor impliedly reserves that measure of
control which gives him the right to re-enter to effectuate his agreement. 21 It is further argued that even if the rule of Hadley v.
Baxendale 22 is rigidly applied, "the nature of the covenant is such
as naturally to create a reasonable anticipation that the neglect to
perform it will probably be the cause of personal injuries being
inflicted on the tenant" ; 23 and moreover, that the covenant to repair
is in many instances the controlling factor in inducing a tenant to
sign a lease.24 But by far the salient point of the minority argument
is that it is only fair that restitution be made by him, who after receiving notice of a condition of disrepair, promises to attend to the
matter, and then by constant dilly-dallying causes his tenant, in
reliance on his promise, to put off making the repairs himself.25 The
admission by such a lessor that he causelessly delayed doing that
which concededly was his solemn obligation, irrefutably lays the
blame for an injury to his inexcusable procrastination.
An Illinois court,26 justifying the old common-law rule, points
out that in the event that the lessor violates his covenant to repair,
the lessee has recourse to four separate remedies. The tenant may:
"(1)-Abandon the premises if they become untenantable by reason
of want of repair; (2)-make the repairs himself and deduct the
cost from the rent; (3)-occupy the premises without repair, and
recoup his damages in an action for rent; (4)-sue for damages for
breach of the covenant to repair, and the damage recoverable in this
last instance is usually the difference between the value of the premises in repair and the value out of repair." Close analysis will expose
the gross inadequacy of all of these remedies. Let us take the case
Collison v. Curtner, 141 Ark. 122, 216 S. W. 1059 (1919) ; Monahan v.
National Realty Co., 4 Ga. App. 680, 62 S.E. 127 (1908); Robinson v. Hell,
128 Md..645, 98 Atl. 195 (1916) ; Barron v. Liedloff, 95 Minn. 474, 104 N. W.
289 (1905); Merchant's Cotton Press & Storage Co. v. Miller, 135 Tenn. 187,
186 S.W. 87 (1916) ; Mesher v. Osborne, 75 Wash. 439, 134 Pac. 1092 (1913) ;
Lowe v. O'Brien, 77 Wash. 677, 138 Pac. 295 (1914); Flood v. Pabst Brewing
Co., 158 Wis. 626, 149 N. W. 489 (1914).
' LAW oF TORTS RFSTATEMENT (Am. L. INsT. 1925) §227.
"26 Eng. L. & Eq. Rep. 398 (1854). "Where two parties have made a
contract which one of them has broken, the damages which the other party
ought to receive in respect to such breach of contract should be such as may
fairly and reasonably be considered as arising naturally, that is, according to
the usual course of things, from said breach of the contract itself, or such as
may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of the parties at

the time they made the contract, as the probable result of a breach of it."
'Mesher v. Osborne, sujpra note 20; SHEARMAN and REDFELD, NEGLIGENCE (6th ed. 1913) §708a, p. 1860.
" See Patten v. Bartlett, 111 Me. 409, 89 AtI. 375 (1914).
'Merchant's Cotton Press & Storage Co. v. Miller, 135 Tenn. 187, 186
S. W. 87 (1916).
Cromwell v. Allen, 151 Ill. App. 404, 408 (1909).
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of a small retailer who leases a store at an agreed rental of $100 a
month. The landlord covenants to keep the premises in repair. The
tenant moves in: fixtures, stock, and name. He soon discovers that
a certain section of the flooring is insufficiently supported. The lessor
is notified, assures the tenant he will take care of the matter, but
consistently delays to do the work. The necessary repairs will cost
$500. Consider the tenant's plight: If he is put to making the repairs
himself, he may seriously deplete his working capital. If he does not
make the repairs, he submits himself to the hazard of incurring a
ruinous liability, through someone being injured. If the tenant
moves out, he sustains an irreparable loss due to consequent depreciation of fixtures, cost of moving, loss of goodwill, etc. At best, if the
tenant can afford the expenditure, makes the repairs, and refuses to
pay rent for the next few months, his depletion of capital to do that
which the landlord contracted to do is tantamount to an extortion of
rent for five months in advance. In a case like this, a statement setting forth the multiplicity of available remedies is almost facetious.
Proper protection can only be afforded the tenant by passing a
statute to the effect that a lessor of real property will be held liable
in tort at the suit of an injured party, lawfully on the premises, after
the lapse of a reasonable time after he (the lessor) has been duly
notified of a condition deserving of repair. Likewise, the fastening
of liability on the more financially responsible landlord would insure
a greater measure of protection to the public. An uncollectible judgment against an impecunious retailer is meagre balm for pain, mental
suffering, and the costs of hospitalization.
The overwhelming number of former decisions in other jurisdictions 27 has not deterred forward-looking courts, uncommitted to

any traditional policy, from veering from the established rule.28

The

law on this matter is in a state of transition,2 9 and the minority
opinion, steadily gaining ground, has won no less an adherent than
the American Law Institute.8 0 The progressive viewpoint of this
eminent group must carry weight with all liberal-thinking students of
jurisprudence.
HAROLD HOROWITZ.

' Smith v. Halluck, 210 Ala. 529, 98 So. 781 (1924) ; Grazer v. Flanagan,
35 Calif. App. 724, 170 Pac. 1076 (1917); Willis v. Snyder, 190 Ia. 248, 180
N. W. 290 (1920); Murrell v. Crawford, 102 Kan. 118, 169 Pac. 561 (1917);
Brady v. Klein, 133 Mich. 422, 95 N. W. 422 (1903); Kohnle v. Paxton, 268
Mo. 463, 188 S. W. 155 (1916); Dustin v. Curtis, 74 N. H. 266, 67 Atl. 220
(1917) ; Jordan v. Miller, 179 N. C. 73 (1919) ; Schradski v. Butler, 22 Ohio
Dec. 701 (1911); Davis v. Smith, 26 R. I. 129, 58 At. 630 (1904).
:' F6r collected authorities see 8 A. L. R. 766; 16 R. C. L. 1059.
:'Supra note 23.
Supra note 21, p. 194. "A lessor of land is subject to liability for bodily
harm caused to his lessee and others upon the land in the right of the lessee by
a condition of disrepair existing before or arising after the lessee has taken
possession if (a) the lessor, as such, has agreed by a covenant in the lease or
otherwise, to keep the land in repair and (b) the disrepair creates an unreasonable risk to persons upon the land which the performance of the lessor's agreement would have prevented."

